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Publication Number 35 
Costs of Regulation 
and Benefits of Reform 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
November 1980 
Progress toward deregulation of the airlines and the elimination 
of many silly job safety regulations have created the notion that 
government regulation is entering a declining phase in the United 
States. The facts, however, support the reverse view. The pace of 
regulation of business is continuing on an upward trajectory. The 
number of agencies, regulatory programs, and authorizing statutes-
and the budgets to carry them out-are all continuing to grow. 
Moreover, a very substantial further expansion of regulation is 
in the government pipeline. Many of the laws passed in recent years 
are in the early growth stages of development. As the U.S. Council 
on Environmental Quality pointed out in its recent annual report 
(1978), current estimates of the burden of regulation "do not yet 
include many costs associated with the hazardous waste section of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act of 1976, and 1977 Amendments to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the 1977 Amendments to 
the Clear Air Act." For most of this legislation, the Council pointed 
out that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is still in the 
process of developing its final regulations, the effects of which will 
not be felt until business and government begin to implement them. 1 
Similar patterns prevail in other areas. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) has recently promulgated a 
generic carcinogenic standard which, when implemented, is likely to 
generate compliance costs greater than the total existing array of 
OSHA standards. 2 The National Highway Traffic Safety 
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Administration is pursuing mileage goals at a pace which will test the 
outer limits of the survival capacity of the relatively few American 
companies that still produce motor vehicles.3 In light of these 
expansions of regulatory activity, surely some perspective is useful. 
THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
It is hard to overestimate the current rapid expansion of 
government involvement in business in the United States. Certainly 
the majority of public policy changes affecting business-government 
relations in recent years has been in the direction of greater 
governmental intervention -environmental controls, job safety 
inspections, equal employment opportunity enforcement, consumer 
product safety regulations, energy restrictions, and so forth. Indeed, 
when we attempt to look at the emerging business-government 
relationship from the business executive's viewpoint, we see a very 
considerable public presence in what historically have been private 
affairs. 
No one who operates a business today, neither the head of a 
large company nor the corner grocer, can do so without considering 
a multitude of government restrictions and regulations. His or her 
costs and profits can be affected as much by a bill passed in 
Washington as by an executive action in the front office or a 
customer's decision at the checkout counter. Management decisions 
fundamental to the business enterprise are increasingly subject to 
governmental influence, review or control. 
In fact, the term "regulated industry" has become archaic. 
Every industry in the United States is feeling the rising power of 
government regulation in each major aspect of its day-to-day 
operations. If we could accurately measure the pervasiveness of 
government intervention, we would not find the economists' 
favorites-electric utilities and railroads-at the top of the list. More 
likely, we would encounter such giants of the manufacturing sector 
as automobile, aerospace, and chemical companies, with the oil 
industry and health services not too far behind. 
Because of the rapid proliferation of government regulatory 
activity in recent years, it should be useful to attempt to measure this 
2 
phenomenon. Let us try to do so by focusing on the resources that 
are required to carry out these efforts. That measurement should 
provide an upper limit to the amount of savings that could result 
from regulatory reform. 
THE COSTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
The costs that result from government regulation of business can 
be analyzed by grouping them into three categories: 
1. The cost of administering the regulatory agencies: This is the 
smallest portion and the easiest to measure. The data are also useful 
indicators of changing trends and relationships in the entire 
regulatory network. 
2. The indirect cost of compliance by the private sector: This element 
is much larger and more difficult to measure. However, as we will 
see, there is a substantial literature on individual programs which can 
be drawn upon to develop useful aggregate estimates. 
3. The induced effects of regulation: This is the most diffuse and 
elusive aspect of measuring the impacts of regulation. Yet there are 
important indicators which show that regulation has extremely 
substantial, long-term effects on innovation, capital formation, and 
the structure of industry. 
The Direct Costs of Regulation 
The expansion of regulation in the United States can be seen 
most readily in the steady increase in the number of major regulatory 
agencies established by the Congress-from fourteen prior to 1930, 
to a little over two dozen in 1950, to a present total of 57. As shown 
in Figure 1, the most rapid expansion occurred not in the New Deal 
period of the 1930s, but rather during the 1970s.4 
The initial and direct effects of government regulation can be 
measured by the budgets of the regulatory agencies themselves, which 
are presented in Table 1. The figure includes such government 
administrative costs as salaries of inspectors, office supplies, and the 
government's own paperwork flow. These are the expenses of 
writing, managing, publishing, and policing regulations. 5 The great 
3 
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TABLE 1 
Expenditures on Federal Regulatory Activities 
(Fiscal Years, Millions of Dollars) 
%of 
(Estimated) % Change 1981 
Area of Regulation 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19811970 to 1979 Budget 
Social Regulation 
Consumer Safety 
and Health ............... $ 392 $ 593 $ 948 $1059 $1251 $1347 $1464 $1772 $2261 $2474 $2606 $2857 +531% 41% 
Job Safety and Other 
Working Conditions ....... 62 104 124 227 310 379 447 492 544 642 742 800 +935% 12% 
Environment and Energy .... 85 146 493 585 759 967 1026 1047 1296 1517 1688 2217 + 1685% 32% 
Total Social Regulation ...... 539 843 1565 1871 2320 2693 2937 3311 4101 4633 5036 5874 +760% 85% 
Economic Regulation 
Finance and Banking ........ 106 123 134 142 158 186 211 240 273 296 294 352 + 179% 5% 
Industry-Specific 
Regulation ............... 125 151 166 140 203 220 251 286 297 318 377 384 + 154% 5% 
General Business ............ 96 105 120 133 153 169 199 225 245 271 316 327 + 182% 5% 
Total Economic 
Regulation ............... 327 379 420 415 514 575 661 751 815 885 987 1063 + 171% 15% 
Grand Total................. $ 866 $1222 $1985 $2286 $2834 $3268 $3598 $4062. $4916 $5518 $6023 $6937 +537% 100% 
Annual Nominal Increase .... 41% 62% 15% 24% 15% 10% 13% 21% 12% 9% 15% 
Annual GNP Deflator ........ 5.1% 4.1% 5.8% 9.7% 9.6% 5.3% 5.5% 7.3% 8.9% 8.9% 8.8% 
GNP Deflator lndex1 ••••••••• 100 105.1 109.4 115.7 127.0 139.2 146.5 154.6 165.9 180.7 196.7 214.0 
Total in 1970$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 866 $1163 $1814 $1976 $2231 $2348 $2456 $2627 $2963 $3054 $3062 $3242 
Annual Real % Increase ...... 34% 56% 9% 13% 5% 5% 7% 13% 3% 0% 6% 
NOTE: 1GNP Deflator figures for years 1971-1977 are taken from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978. Figures for 1978-1981 
are taken from the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981. 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
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These governmental outlays indicate the costs of regulation 
which are borne by the taxpayer. Estimates for the fiscal year 1980 
show a total of $6.0 billion in federal expenditures to operate the 57 
agencies which regulate business. That dollar figure represents nearly 
a six-fold increase from the 1970 level of $866 million. There has 
been, and continues to be, a steady growth in the pace of regulatory 
activities. In fact, budget estimates for the regulatory agencies for 
fiscal 1981 show an increase of nearly $1 billion, to a total of $6.9 
billion in administrative costs-a 15 percent increase over 1980 
figures. 
In short, the cost of operating federal regulatory agencies is 
rising more rapidly than the federal budget as a whole, the 
population of the country, or the gross national product. The costs 
to the taxpayer are obviously not trivial, but the key effects of 
government regulation must be seen in terms of the compliance by 
the private sector. 
The Indirect Cost of Regulation 
At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable 
requirements on business through the regulatory process appears to 
be an inexpensive way of achieving national objectives. This practice 
apparently costs the government little-about one percent of the 
federal budget. But the public does not escape paying the cost. Every 
time, for example, that the EPA imposes a more costly (albeit less 
polluting) method of production on any firm, the cost of the firm's 
product to the consumer will tend to rise. Similar effects flow from 
other regulatory efforts, including those involving product safety, job 
health, and hiring and promotion policies. 
These higher prices represent the ''hidden tax'' of regulation 
that is shifted from the government to the consumer. Moreover, to 
the extent that government-mandated requirements impose similar 
costs on all price categories of a given product (such as passenger 
automobiles), this hidden tax tends to be more regressive than the 
income tax or sales taxes. Of course, it is not inevitable that every 
regulatory activity will increase inflationary pressures. Where 
6 
regulation generates social benefits (such as a healthier and thus more 
productive work force) in excess of the social costs it imposes, 
inflationary pressures should be reduced. 
At times the impact of regulation on the prices that consumers 
pay is direct and visible. The federal government has required the 
producers of automobiles to incorporate in their product a wide 
array of specified safety and environmental features. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics each year estimates the added price of the typical 
passenger automobile resulting from the safety and ecological 
features which were incorporated that year in response to federal 
requirements. In Table 2, these items are summed and put on a 
consistent price basis. Through 1978, the cumulative cost increase per 
vehicle of these mandated features came to $666, or $7 billion for the 
vehicles sold that year. 
Numerous other costs in the private sector result from the 
activities of regulatory agencies. In a few cases-notably EPA and 
OSHA -comprehensive annual surveys of the cost of compliance are 
available. An annual survey by the McGraw-Hill Department of 
Economics reports the capital outlays that are made to meet OSHA 
standards; its current estimates are in the neighborhood of $3.5 
billion a year. 
The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) projects 
each year the incremental capital and operating costs that arise from 
environmental regulation. As can be seen in Table 3, the annual cost 
of incremental pollution abatement expenditures was $26.9 billion in 
1978, consisting of $14.0 billion of current costs and $12.9 billion for 
amortization of capital costs. CEQ estimates that these costs will rise 
to $64.0 billion in 1987 (measured in constant 1978 dollars) and that, 
over the decade, approximately $478 billion will be spent to comply 
with federal environmental legislation, above and beyond those 
substantial outlays that would have been made in the absence of such 
legislation. 
Another very substantial direct cost is borne by business firms 
that must fill out the never-ending flow of questionnaires and other 
forms issued by the regulatory agencies. The Federal Paperwork 
7 
TABLE 2 
Increase in Retail Price of Automobiles Due to Federal Requirements 
Year of 
Regulation 
1968 
1968-69 
1969 
1970 
1968-70 
1971 
1972 
1972-73 
1973 
1969-73 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Government Mandated Equipment 
Seat and shoulder belts, standards for 
exhaust emissions 
Windshield defrosting systems, door 
latches, etc. 
Head restraints 
Reflective devices and further 
emission standards 
Ignition locking and buzzing systems, etc. 
Fuel evaporative systems 
Improved exhaust emissions and warranty 
changes; seat belt warning system 
Exterior protection 
Reduced flammability materials, etc. 
Improved side door strength 
Interlock system and improved 
exhaust emissions 
Additional safety features and 
catalytic converter 
Hydraulic brakes, improved bumpers, etc., 
(less savings from removal of 
interlock system) 
Leak resistant fuel system, etc. 
Redesign of emissions controls 
TOTAL 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
8 
Estimated 
Current 
Cost 
$ 47.84 
14.53 
27.48 
14.77 
12.75 
28.33 
42.37 
95.29 
8.72 
20.85 
133.50 
146.66 
41.54 
21.25 
9.99 
$665.87 
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Commission estimated that this paperwork burden costs businesses 
from $25 to $32 billion each year. 6 
For many of the older regulatory agencies-such as the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB)-independent scholars have estimated the costs for all 
or a portion of the regulations. Usually, each estimate has covered 
a different time period. The Center for the Study of American 
Business at Washington University culled from the literature what 
were considered to be the best estimates, usually taking the lower end 
if a range was offered, and put the results on a consistent price basis. 
Industry-specific regulations (such as those of the ICC, CAB, etc.) 
figure prominently, in part because of the wealth of data available on 
them. For many of the newer regulatory agencies, however, such as 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Department of 
Energy, reasonable compliance costs have not been developed, and 
thus implicitly they were carried at zero, except for the paperwork 
burden. This procedure yields both a major underestimate and a 
clear opportunity for further research. The resulting estimate of the 
compliance costs came to $63 billion in 1976 (see Table 4). 
TABLE 4 
Annual Cost of Federal Regulation 
By Area, Calendar 1976 
(millions of dollars) 
Area 
Consumer Safety and Health 
Job Safety and Working Conditions 
Energy and the Environment 
Financial Regulation 
Industry Specific 
Paperwork 
TOTAL 
(a) Included in other categories 
Administrative Compliance 
Cost Cost 
$1,516 
483 
612 
104 
484 
(a) 
$3,199 
$ 5,094 
4,015 
7,760 
1,118 
19,919 
25,000 
$62,906 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
10 
Total 
$ 6,610 
4,498 
8,372 
1,222 
20,403 
25,000 
$66,105 
t 
These estimated compliance costs were approximately twenty times 
larger than the budgets of the agencies issuing the regulations. 7 
Thus, on the average, each dollar that Congress appropriates for 
regulation results in an additional $20 of costs imposed on the 
private sector of the economy. In a more recent report prepared for 
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, I attempted to 
prepare a rough update of these figures by using the multiplier of 20 
to 1 that was obtained in the base period and applying it to the 
budget data for more recent years. The results showed the continued 
upward movement in the costs resulting from federal regulation of 
business. 8 Using that approach, the estimated aggregate cost of 
issuing and complying with federal regulations comes to about $126 
billion in the fiscal year 1980, or over $500 for each man, woman, 
and child in the United States (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
Estimated Cost of Federal Regulation of Business 
(Fiscal years, in billions of dollars) 
1977 1978 1979 
Administrative Costs $ 4.1 $ 4.9 $ 5.5 
Compliance Costs $82.0 $ 98.0 110.0 
TOTAL $86.1 $102.9 $115.5 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
11 
(estimated) 
1980 
$ 6.0 
120.0 
$126.0 
The Induced Effects of Regulation 
Some of the most powerful effects that flow from the exercise of 
the government's rule-making power are even more difficult to 
quantify. Those induced impacts of regulation include the following: 
The innovative product research and development that is not 
performed because corporate research and development budgets 
increasingly are being devoted to what is termed udefensive 
research." A number of individual companies report that they devote 
large and growing shares of their scientific resources to meeting 
regulatory requirements or to avoiding violations of regulatory 
restrictions. For example, one hidden cost of government regulation 
is a reduced rate of introduction of new products. The longer it takes 
for a new product to be approved by a government agency-or the 
more costly the approval process-the less likely that the new 
product will be created. In any event, innovation will be delayed. 
The impacts are most conspicuous in the pharmaceutical area and are 
likewise becoming onerous in the chemical products sector, partic-
ularly as the toxic substance control regulations are promulgated. 
The new investments in plant and equipment that are not made 
because the funds must be diverted to meeting government-mandated 
social requirements. The resultant loss of productivity has been 
measured for environmental and job safety by Edward Denison of 
the Department of Commerce at about one fourth of the potential 
average annual increase in productivity.9 
Capital formation and productivity are also adversely affected 
by the uncertainty about the future of regulations governing the 
introduction of new processes and products. An example is furnished 
in the report of a task force of the U.S. Energy Resources Council 
which dealt with the possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel 
industry. In considering the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, the task force stated that the major uncertainty was not 
whether a project would be allowed to proceed, but rather the length 
of time it would be delayed pending the issuance of an environmental 
impact statement that would stand up in court. In assessing the 
overall impact of government regulatory activity on the establishment 
12 
of a new energy industry, the task force concluded, ''In summary, 
some of these requirements could easily hold up or permanently 
postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels plant.'' 10 
The recent cancellation of the SOHIO pipeline project (in 1979) 
provides evidence that the regulatory uncertainties are not limited in 
their adverse impacts to new (coal degasification) or even 
controversial (nuclear) technologies. 
The workers that are not hired because federal regulations have 
priced them out of labor markets. One increase in the statutory 
minimum wage reduced teenage employment in the United States by 
over 200,000 below what it otherwise would have been. 11 In 
construction labor, where unemployment rates are substantially 
above the national average, government regulation also has acted to 
price some segments of the work force out of competitive labor 
markets. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, "prevailing" wages are paid 
on federal and federally supported construction projects. These 
government-mandated wage rates are often higher than those that 
actually prevail in the labor market where the work is done. 12 
The concentration of industry that results as smaller enterprises 
find that the burdens of government regulation fall on them 
disproportionately hard. Most of this impact is unintentional, in that 
the regulations typically do not distinguish among companies of 
different sizes. But forcing a small firm to fill out the same 
specialized forms-or to develop a new type of equipment-as a 
large company with highly-trained technical staffs places a 
significantly greater burden on that smaller enterprise. This general 
point is supported by data and examples for such different 
governmental regulatory activities as the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the 
National Labor Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Securities Exchange Commission. 13 
The immeasurable effects of government regulation on the basic 
entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise system. To the extent 
that management's attention is diverted from traditional product 
development, production, and marketing concerns to meeting 
13 
governmentally imposed social requirements, a significant 
bureaucratization of corporate activity results. 
In employee pension fund management, for example, pension 
regulation has shifted much of the concern of fund managers from 
maximizing the return on the contributions to a more cautious 
approach of minimizing the likelihood that the managers will be 
criticized for their investment decisions. It thus has become 
safer-although not necessarily more desirable for the employees 
covered-for the pension managers to keep more detailed records of 
their deliberations, to hire more outside experts (so that the 
responsibility can be diluted), and to avoid innovative investments. 
In short, federal regulatory activity is resulting in a significant 
bureaucratization of business activity. The ultimate costs of excessive 
government involvement in the economy are not always visible but 
surely are powerful-the factories that are not built, the jobs that are 
not created, the goods and services that are not produced, and the 
incomes that are not generated. These effects have formidable impact 
on our standard of living and our quality of life. 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMIC THINKING 
It must be recognized that impetus for most of the expansion in 
government power over business is not being provided by the 
industries being regulated. Generally, businesses have shown a 
minimum of enthusiasm for EPA, OSHA, ERISA, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), etc. If anything, the 
companies claim that the "benefits" to them of these regulations are 
negative. The pressures for the new style of regulation come, rather, 
from a variety of citizen groups concerned primarily with non-
economic aspects of our national life-environmentalists, consumer 
groups, labor unions, and civil rights organizations. Professor Barry 
Weingast of Washington University has been developing a more 
comprehensive theory of the relationships among the regulators and 
the regulated, an approach that tries to take account of the changing 
balance among public and private interest groups. 14 
14 
To talk or write about the regulated industry ''capturing'' its 
regulators is, to put it kindly, a rather quaint way of viewing the 
fundamental shift in business decision making now taking place: the 
shift of power from private managers to public officials. Yet, the 
core of the economists' version of the "capture" theory still 
holds-public policy tends to be dominated by the organized and 
compact pressure groups which attain their benefits at the expense of 
the more diffused and larger body of consumers. 15 But the nature of 
those interest groups has changed in recent years. Rather than the 
railroad baron (a relatively easy target for attack), the villain of the 
piece has become a self-styled representative of "the public interest," 
who has succeeded so frequently in identifying his or her personal 
prejudices with the national well-being. The business firm, in 
contrast, performing its traditional middleman function, more 
typically serves the unappreciated and involuntary role of proxy for 
the overall consumer interest. 
It is not a question of begrudging a "few" more billion dollars 
for job safety, consumer health, etc. The truth is that the typical 
regulatory program is not reaching the worthy objectives it was 
established to attain. For instance, take the job safety program: 
despite the array of regulations, inspections, and proceedings-and, 
of course, the billions pf dollars devoted each year to meeting the 
federal safety standards-we see no improvement in the statistics on 
days lost due to job health and safety hazards. 
But that is no isolated example. Surely the railroad passenger-
_that vanishing breed of consumer-does not benefit from the mass 
of regulation maintained over rail companies by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Unfortunately, these are typical and not 
unusual cases. Virtually every study of regulatory experience-
ranging from trucking to pharmaceuticals to pensions-indicates 
both needless expense and ineffective operations or, worse yet, 
counterproductive results. 
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APPROACHES TO REGULATORY REFORM 
Economists are prone to take measurements of economic 
phenomena. The numbers, of course, are not an end in themselves, 
but an input to decision makers. The measurement of the costs and 
related impacts that flow from government regulation is no esoteric 
matter. This information can be used in many ways. First of all, the 
cost data show the public and the government the economic 
importance that regulation has assumed, especially as measured by 
the large dollar amounts of resources that are required in order to 
meet federal mandates. 
Second, this information helps to shift the public dialogue onto 
new and higher ground. The pertinent policy questions are no longer, 
"Are you for or against clean air or safe products?" or other such 
absolutes. Increasingly, the public discussions are formed in terms of 
less emotional and long-neglected questions such as, "How well is 
the regulatory process working?" and, "Are there better ways of 
achieving the public's desires?" 
Finally, the availability of information on the costs of regulation 
is an important step in reforming the regulatory process. The 
pressure of the cost data inevitably leads to proposals for benefit/ 
cost analyses, cost-effectiveness studies, risk-benefit evaluations, and 
similar analytical approaches to what in the past had been viewed too 
often as emotional issues. Hopefully, legislation reforming regulatory 
practices will mandate such analytical techniques and thus improve 
the cost-and benefit-data that are used in the regulatory process. 
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of 
regulatory programs is needed. A parallel can be drawn to 
macroeconomic matters, where important and conflicting objectives 
are recognized and attempts at trade-offs are made (for example, as 
between economic growth and price stability). At the microeconomic 
level, it is likewise appropriate to reconcile the goals of specific 
government programs with national objectives. Environmental 
protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts should be 
related to costs to the consumer, availability of new products, and 
employment. In part, this reconciliation can be made at the initial 
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stages of the government process, when the president proposes and 
the Congress enacts a new regulatory program. 
Benefit -Cost Analysis 
One device for broadening the horizons of government 
policymakers and administrators is the economic impact statement. 
Policymakers could be required to consider the costs (and other 
adverse effects) of their actions as well as the benefits. This is not a 
novel idea. In November 1974, then-President Gerald Ford instructed 
the federal agencies under his jurisdiction to examine the effects of 
major regulatory actions on costs, productivity, employment, and 
other economic factors. President Carter has continued this effort, 
with some modifications. 
This first step is subject to several shortcomings. Many of the 
key regulatory agencies-ranging from the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to the Federal Trade Commission-are so-called 
"independent agencies," which are beyond the president's 
jurisdiction in these matters. Even in the case of the regulatory 
activities that come within presidential oversight, the agencies covered 
by the Executive Order are required only to examine the economic 
aspects of their actions; the weight they give to economic factors 
remains at their discretion-to the extent that Congressional statutes 
permit them to give any consideration to economic influences at all. 
A broader approach is needed, one with a strong legislative 
mandate. In the fashion of the environmental impact statements (but 
without as much of the trivia), Congress should require each 
regulatory agency to assess the impact of its proposed actions on the 
society as a whole, and particularly on the economy. Much would 
depend on the ''teeth'' put into any required economic impact 
statement. Merely legislating the performance of some economic 
analysis by an unsympathetic regulator would serve little purpose 
beyond delaying the regulatory process and making it more costly. 
But limiting government regulation to those instances where the total 
benefits to society exceed the costs would be a major departure from 
current practice. 
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Government regulation should be carried to the point where the 
incremental costs equal the incremental benefits, and no further. 
Indeed, this is the basic criterion that is generally used to screen 
government investments in physical resources. Overregulation is not 
an emotional term. It is the economist's shorthand for regulation for 
which the costs exceed the benefits. 
The critics of the analytical approach to evaluate government 
regulation tend to forget that benefit/ cost analysis is a neutral 
concept. It gives as much weight to a dollar of benefits as to a dollar 
of costs. And, in a broader sense, the estimation of benefits and 
costs need not be necessarily viewed in dollar terms. The costs as well 
as the benefits may at times properly be measured in terms of human 
life. For example, OSHA regulations may have a very high 
opportunity cost when they divert professional safety staffs of the 
companies from their traditional duty of training workers in safer 
procedures. The "benefits" of following rules printed in the Federal 
Register may be far more illusory and surely fewer. 
The implementation of benefit/ cost analyses needs a great deal 
of attention. After all, a reluctant agency can merely go through the 
motions of studying the effects of its actions on the economy and 
then proceed as it originally intended. An agency not directly 
involved in regulation -such as the General Accounting Office or the 
Office of Management and Budget-should set government-wide 
standards, concepts, and methods of performing economic 
evaluations of regulations, including the estimation of benefits and 
costs. The determination of the interest rates to be used in 
discounting future costs and benefits, for example, should not be a 
matter left to the judgment of the agency which is attempting to 
justify its own action. Where a dollar sign cannot be placed on the 
benefits, reliance can be placed on cost/ effectiveness analysis, which 
is a search for least-cost solutions. 
As a minimum, the Congress should endorse the kind of 
common sense that was embodied in a federal court decision which 
stopped OSHA from issuing new benzene regulations. The court's 
language is instructive: ''Although the agency does not have to 
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conduct an elaborate cost/benefit analysis ... it does have to 
determine whether the benefits expected from the standards bear a 
reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard." 16 
(When OSHA appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, its 
benzene standards were rejected.) 
The ability of the executive branch to change the basic 
regulatory system is limited. Each regulation is issued in accord with 
a law passed by Congress. Reform measures cannot simply be 
"proclaimed," they must be legislated. Many of the proposals to 
reform government regulation involve the "sunset" mechanism-the 
compulsory periodic review of each major regulatory program to 
determine whether it is worthwhile to continue it in the light of 
changing circumstances. This procedure would provide Congress with 
a formal opportunity to revise the underlying regulatory statutes or 
to determine that a given regulatory program is no longer needed and 
that the "sun" should be allowed to "set" on it. A benefit/ cost 
analysis would provide a quantitative mechanism that would help in 
making those value judgments. 
Budgeting as a Management Tool 
Greater attention should be given to the role of the Congres-
sional budget process in managing regulation. In those cases where an 
agency's regulations generate more costs than benefits, the agency's 
budget for the coming year should be reduced, and perhaps vice versa. 
Because the appropriations for the regulatory agencies are small 
portions of the government's total budget, limited attention has been 
given to them in the budget process. In view of the large costs that they 
often impose on the society as a whole, greater attention is warranted in 
reviewing their appropriation requests via a regulatory budget. 
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation 
Fundamentally, regulatory reform is not a concern with technical 
measurements or administrative procedures. Rather, government 
decision makers need to take a very different view of the regulatory 
mechanism than they do now. Rather than relying on regulation to 
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control in detail every facet of private behavior, the regulatory device 
needs to be seen as a powerful tool to be used reluctantly and with 
great care and discretion. Consequently, it is attitudes that need to be 
changed. Experience with the job safety program provides a cogent 
example. Although the government's safety rules have resulted in 
billions of dollars in public and private outlays, the goal of a safer 
work environment has not been achieved. 
A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of 
government regulation of private activities requires a major change in 
the approach taken to regulation, and one not limited to the job 
safety program. Indeed, that program is used here merely as an 
illustration. If the objective of public policy is to reduce accidents, 
then public policy should focus directly on the reduction of accidents. 
Excessively detailed regulations are often merely a substitute-the 
normal bureaucratic substitute-for hard policy decisions. 
Rather than placing emphasis on issuing citations to employers 
who fail to fill forms out correctly or who do not post the required 
notices, stress should be placed on the regulation of those employers 
with high and rising accident rates. Perhaps fines should be levied on 
those establishments with the worst safety records. As the accident 
rates decline toward some sensible standard, the fines could be 
reduced or eliminated. But the government should not be much 
concerned with the way a specific organization achieves a safer 
working environment. Some companies may find it more efficient to 
change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to 
retrain workers. The making of this choice is precisely the kind of 
operational business decision making that government should avoid, 
but that now dominates many regulatory programs. 
Alternatives to Regulation 
The promulgation by government of rules and regulations 
restricting or prescribing private activity is not, of course, the only 
means of accomplishing public objectives. Codes of behavior adhered 
to on a voluntary basis can be effective. Government itself has 
available to it various powers other than the regulatory mechanism. 
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Through its taxing authority, the government can provide strong 
signals to the market. Rather than promulgating detailed regulations 
governing allowable discharges into the nation's waterways, the 
government could levy substantial taxes on those discharges. 
The use of taxation would be meant neither to punish polluters 
nor to give them a "license" to pollute. Rather, it would work 
through the price system to encourage producers and consumers to 
shift to less polluting ways of producing and consuming goods and 
services. Price incentives tend to force the environmental agencies to 
consider explicitly the cost of cleaning up pollution, while direct 
controls make it very easy to adopt extremely expensive if not 
unrealistic goals, such as zero discharge. 
In the case of the traditional, one-industry type of government 
regulation (as of airlines, trucking, and railroads), a greater role 
should be given to the competitive process and to market forces. 
Unlike the newer forms of regulation, the older forms of regulation 
are often mainly barriers to entry into a given industry, protecting 
existing firms from competition by potential new entrants. To date, 
none of the procedural reforms previously described has been 
enacted by the Congress. Perhaps the most significant single legis-
lative action in the regulatory reform area in recent years was the law 
phasing out the Civil Aeronautics Board over a seven year period. 
With reference to consumer protection, an information strategy 
can provide a sensible alternative to compulsory product standards. 
For the many visible hazards that consumers voluntarily subject 
themselves to, the most important consideration in public policy is to 
improve the individual's knowledge of the risks involved rather than 
limit personal discretion. In their daily lives, citizens rarely opt for 
zero-risk alternatives and more often trade off between speed and 
safety, for example. 
The more widespread provision of information to consumers on 
potential hazards in various products may, in many circumstances, be 
far more effective than banning specific products or setting standards 
requiring expensive alterations in existing products. The information 
approach takes account of the great variety of consumer desires and 
capabilities. Interestingly enough, this approach often is favored in 
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consumer surveys, although not by some of the most vehement 
representatives of the so-called public interest groups. 
Any realistic appraisal of government regulation must 
acknowledge that important and positive benefits have resulted from 
many of the regulatory activities-less pollution, fewer product 
hazards, reducing job discrimination, and other socially desirable 
goals of our society. But the "externalities" generated by federal 
regulation do not justify government attempting to regulate every 
facet of private behavior. A reasonable approach to this problem 
requires great discrimination in sorting out the hazards that are 
important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that can best 
be dealt with through the normal prudence of consumers, workers, 
and business firmS. 17 
THE SAVINGS FROM REGULATORY REFORM 
It is difficult to estimate the specific savings that would occur 
from the adoption of any of the approaches to regulatory reform 
suggested here. What is clear, however, is that each of these changes 
could reduce the economic burden of government rule-making while 
often increasing the likelihood of reaching the nation's basic goals 
and objectives. This is most apparent in the case of economic 
regulation, where the reliance on competition would be a far less 
costly way of meeting the public's transportation demands than the 
status quo of detailed regulation. 
On the basis of the data in Table 4, savings in the area of 
economic regulation-by deregulating the airline, railroad, trucking, 
radio and television industries-could well reach $20 billion a year. 
In the field of social regulation, a reasonable initial objective would 
be to slow down, if not halt, the now rapid rise in the issuance-and 
thus the cost of complying with-new rules and directives. As 
pointed out earlier, one major new OSHA standard alone may likely 
generate a larger economic burden of compliance than the entire 
array of existing rules issued by that agency, which imposes costs of 
over $3 billion a year at present. Moreover, the potential cost of new 
environmental regulations already in the ''pipeline'' is far greater. 
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Thus, the measurable dollar savings from regulatory reform 
surely could be substantial. But, in the long run, the most important 
benefits from changing the status quo would be the improved 
productivity, the higher rates of capital formation and innovation, 
and ultimately the improved living standards that would result for 
American consumers. That surely makes regulatory reform a worthy 
and high-priority undertaking. 
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